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they have performed the wrong action, but because they have violated 
the trust of others. This trust is grounded in the expectation that agents 
have a fundamental disposition to accord deontic constraints a certain 
weight against desiderative constraints in their practical deliberations. 
It is this disposition that, at root, enables them to adopt rules to govern 
their conduct, which in turn allow them to avoid suboptimal interaction 
patterns. When the distinction between deontic, doxastic, and desidera­
tive constraints is sharply drawn, the way that these rules are integrated 
into Hie agent's delibera tions, along with the role of internal and external 
control in social integration, can be clearly specified.
VII Conclusion
An enormous amount of effort has been expended in recent years in an 
attempt to show that instrumentally rational agents can adopt commit­
ments, special choice dispositions, or some other mechanism that will 
allow them to work their way out of suboptimal outcomes. The under­
lying motivation has been to explain how it is that we are able to avoid 
the extremes of uncooperative behavior that simple instrumental theo­
ries of rationality consistently predict. Over the years, the arguments 
advanced have become increasingly baroque.27 The model presented 
here is comparatively simple. It shows how agents are able to cooperate 
with one another, even when more desirable outcomes can be achieved 
through defection. By integrating preferences for actions into the agent's 
overall utility function, without thereby obscuring the distinction be­
tween preferences for actions and preferences for outcomes, the model 
is able to provide an extremely straightforward representation of the 
way that norms might function as deontic constraints in social choice. 
Hie fact that the model is also able to supply deliberative micro-founda­
tions for a 'focal point'-style solution to coordination problems is an 
unexpected bonus. It functions as indirect support for the proposed 
analysis, however, insofar as it fulfills the traditional expectation, among 
sociological theorists, that a solution to the 'problem of order' will 
require an account of both cooperation and coordination.
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27 Compare David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986) with 
David Gauthier, 'Assure and Threaten,' Ethics 104 (1994) 690-721.
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Among tire more notorious of Cartesian doctrines is the bete machine 
doctrine — the view that brute animals lack not only reason, but any 
form of consciousness (having no mind or soul). Recent English com­
mentaries have served to obscure, rather than to clarify, the historical 
Descartes's views. Standard interpretations have it that insofar as Des­
cartes intends to establish the bete machine doctrine his arguments are 
palpably flawed. One camp of interpreters thus disputes that he even 
holds the doctrine. As I shall attempt to show, not only does Descartes 
affirm the doctrine, his supporting arguments are not palpably flawed
— even if they ultimately come up short. It will indeed emerge that, in 
making his case, Descartes employs interesting argumentative strategies 
that have not been duly appreciated.
On my reconstruction, Descartes's account centers around the follow­
ing probabilistic argument:
(1) Experiments with mechanical physiology establish that purely 
mechanical causes are sufficient to explain all behavior of brutes, 
save that which is apparently reasoned.
1 I am grateful to Robert Audi, Stephen M. Downes, Paul Hoffman, Nicholas Jolley, 
Alan Nelson, Ram Neta, Marieen Rozem ond, and anonymous referees for the 
Caimdiatt journal of Philosophy for feedback on the ideas in this paper, I have also 
benefited from discussions with audiences in philosophy colloquia at Kansas State 
University and the University of California, Irvine.
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(2) Experiments with the behavior of humans and brutes establish 
that the apparently reasoned behavior of brutes is best explained 
as deriving from purely mechanical causes, not a faculty of rea­
son.
(3) Entities that are explanatorily superfluous (e.g. souls and other 
substantial forms) are to be eliminated.
(4) The souls of brutes (and thus all consciousness in brutes) are to 
be eliminated. [(1),(2),(3)]
The present paper is organized around this argument.
hi §1,1 discuss the analogical character of the argument and its impor­
tance in light of Descartes's targeted audience. As conveyed in the 
formulation above, Descartes's case for the bete machine doctrine is 
broadly based in an analogy between humans and brutes. This under­
standing of the project challenges conventional wisdom according to 
which Descartes is inattentive to this analogy. This standard objection 
typically rests on the assumption that, had he noticed the strength of the 
analogy, he'd also have noticed that his Draconian, eliminativist argu­
ments apply with equal force to brutes and humans. This line of objection 
traces back at least as early as the Fifth Replies where Gassendi com­
plains that, though Descartes appeals to ‘blind impulse' to explain the 
behavior of brutes, he appeals to 'some quite different' explanation of 
analogous forms of human behavior (CSM 2:188, AT 7:269-70)2
In §11, I address premise (1), a step that Descartes aims largely at 
scholastic readers. The tendency in the literature has been to ignore diis 
step, focusing exclusive attention on the famous 'two tests' (discussed 
below) which purport to deny brutes a rational soul. At its worst, this 
tendency leaves Descartes with no argument against scholastics, an 
audience that already denies brutes a radonal soul while maintaining 
that they have sensitive souls which provide sensory awareness.
In §111,1 turn attention to premise (2) and Descartes's famous two tests 
of rationality. The locus classicus for his treatment of the bete machine 
doctrine is part 5 of his Discourse on the Method. He there proposes 'two 
very certain means of recognizing' that some creatures lack reason and 
are thus 'not real men' (CSM 1:139-40, AT 6:56). On standard interpreta-
2 'AT' = C. Adam and P. Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin 1904); 'CSM' 
= J. Cottingham, K. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, eds,, The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984); 'CSMK' = Volume III of 
CSM for which Anthony Kenny is a contributing translator. References to both AT 
and CSM are to the volume and page.
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tions the two tests are intended to reveal whether or not an organism has 
a faculty of reason,3 This understanding of the tests commits Descartes 
to the view that some forms of human behavior cannot be imitated by 
machines. So construed, Descartes is open to the criticism that he se­
verely underestimates the imitative abilities of machines,4 a bad miscal­
culation even given his 17th-century understanding of mechanist 
principles. I shall challenge this standard account, arguing that the two 
tests of Discourse 5 are intended only as negative tests — i.e. tests 
designed to reveal that a behavior is not reason driven (being instead an 
automatism), but not that it zs reason driven. The Descartes emerging 
from my account has a far more sophisticated view of the imitative 
abilities of machines than on standard interpretations-
In §IV, I take up issues surrounding premise (3) and its importance to 
Descartes's broader case. In thus attributing to Descartes an appeal to 
the principle of parsimony, my interpretation again challenges conven­
tional wisdom. On standard accounts Descartes does not invoke parsi­
mony; it is indeed widely agreed that there's an intolerable logical gap 
between the premise set he intends to invoke, and the conclusion in (4), 
This widely held interpretive thesis has engendered two interpretive 
camps. One camp has Descartes affirming Hie bete machine doctrine, thus 
finding him guilty of the egregious non sequitur.5 Another camp excul­
pates him, by denying that he endorses the bete machine doctrine. On this 
latter interpretation, Descartes holds that the behavior of brutes is auto- 
matistic, but not that brutes are mere automata (allowing them sensory 
awareness)." As I'll argue, numerous unpublished texts (including early
3 Cf, J, Bennett, Thoughtful Brutes/ Presidential Address, American Philosophical 
Association (1988), 199; N, Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (N ew  York: Harper and 
Row 1966), 78n.9; J. Cottingham, 'Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and 
Science,' in J. Cottingham, ed., Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press 1992), 250; D. Radrier and M. Radner, Animal Consciousness 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books 1989), 41; M. Rozem ond, 'The Role of the Intellect in 
Descartes's Case for the Incorporeality of the Mind,' in Stephen Voss, ed.. Essays on 
the Philosophy and Sciericc of Rene Descartes (Oxford; Oxford University Press 1993), 
99; and MLD. Wilson, 'Animal Ideas,' Presidential Address, American Philosophical 
Association (1995), 12.
4 Cf. Cottingham, 'Cartesian Dualism,' 250).
5 Cf. L.E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1981), 112f.; 
D. Radner and M, Radner, Animat Consciousness, 79; and Z. Vendler, Res Cogitaus 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1972), 152ff.
6 Cf. J. Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes? Descartes's Treatment of Animals,' in J.
Cottingham, ed,, Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), 230; and S. 
Gaukroger, Descartes (Oxford: Clarendon 1995), 289.
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work on which premise (1) draws) establish that Descartes intends to 
eliminate sensitive souls in brutes (along with other scholastic substan­
tial forms) by appeal to parsimony — thus avoiding the alleged non 
sequitur. That so many commentators have missed this is likely owed to 
the aforementioned neglect of Descartes's anti-scholastic program.
Though my central aim is to reconstruct (not to defend) Descartes's 
argument, a charitable reconstruction inevitably aims at plausibility. The 
strength of Descartes's position is best appreciated in the precise meta­
physical and epistemological context in which the argument of Discourse 
5 is embedded. I shall thus assume his central metaphysical doctrines as 
sketched out in Discourse 4 and more carefully in the Meditations7 Ac­
cordingly, there are two fundamental, really distinct kinds of being: 
mental {i.e. thinking, or conscious) and material (i.e. mechanical). In that 
human persons consist of both kinds, our anatomical behavior may 
l esult from either of two, really distinct kinds of causes: willings, or local 
motion. Though Descartes purports to establish the metaphysical doc­
trines of Discourse 4 with metaphysical certainty (cf, AT 6:37f),H his 
inquiry assumes a less ambitious grade of certainty early in Discourse 5
(cf. AT 6:45f) upon turning attention to the case for the bete machine 
doctrine.
1 Correcting Misinformed Appeals To Analogy
Descartes's rejection of souls in brutes is the result not of inattention to 
the close analogy between their behavior and ours, but of what he takes 
as the strength of the analogy, hi his view, analogical arguments pur­
porting to establish that brutes have souls are typically grounded in 
mistaken assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Some such 
assumption informs the two kinds of views he looks to target — com- 
monsensical views, and the doctrines of the Schools.
According to Descartes, a pervasive and commonsensical assumption 
has it that the fundamental mover shaping human behavior is the soul:
7 The general disfavor into whidi these doctrines have fallen render this an enor­
mously generous assumption. Bear in mind that my aim is to clarify why Descartes 
would think — m the light of his philosophical system — that the bete machine 
doctrine provides the best account of observed behavior in brute animals.
8 In Discourse 4, Descartes contrasts metaphysical certainty with moral certainty. Mor­
ally certain matters are such 'that it seems we cannot doubt them without being
extravagant' (CSM 1:130, AT 6:37-8; cf. Principles 4:205-6).
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We have all found by experience that many bodily movements occur in obedience 
to the will, which is one of the fa cu I ties of the soul, and this has led us to believe that 
the soul is the principle responsible for all bodily movement. (CSM 1:314, AT 11:224; 
Description of the Human Body)9
On this basis, commonsensical judgments are formed — by analogy — 
as to the causes of behavior in brutes:
Most of the actions of animals resemble ours, and throughout our lives this has given 
us many occasions to judge that they act by an interior principle like the one within  
ourselves, that is to say [according to the common, rash opinion], by means o f a soul 
which has feelings and passions like ours, (CSMK 99, AT 2:39; 1638 letter to Reneri 
for Pol lot; cf, AT 5:276)
In his widely read Apology fo r  Raymond Sebond, Montaigne popularizes 
arguments of this sort. Putting heavy emphasis on analogy, he urges that 
'we must infer from like results like faculties.'10 We see even 'in our 
cruder works, the faculties that we use, and that our soul applies itself 
with all its power; why do we not think the same tiling of them [brutes]?' 
(ibid., 333) 'Why do we imagine in them this compulsion of nature, we 
who feel no similar effect?' (ibid., 337) Though Montaigne's defense of 
rationality in brutes is subtle and philosophical,111 shall nonetheless refer 
to Iris position as 'commonsensical.' The appellation is fitting, because 
he so aptly articulates that feature of commonsensical accounts that 
Descartes means to rebut. The principal problem lies not so much with 
Montaigne's like effects, like causes principle as with the underlying as­
sumption as to the vast influence of the human soul.
For Descartes, scholastic accounts also attribute too much of human 
behavior to the regulation of the soul. The hylomorphic doctrines of 
Aristotelianism stem in part from a misguided anthropomorphization 
of the world: all manner of natural phenomena is explained by appeal 
to appetites, intentions, and various powers modeled after the workings 
of the human soul.
9 Descartes adds: 'Our ignorance o f anatomy and mechanics has also played a major 
role here. For in restricting our consideration to the outside of the human body, we 
have never imagined that it has within it enough organs or mechanisms to m ove of 
its own accord in all the different w ays which w e observe' (ibid.).
10 M, Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, D. Frame, trans. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press 1957), 336
11 A s is that of other nonvetntx Pyrrhotiiens — cf. the defense of Pierre Charron (a 
disciple of Montaigne), in his O f Wisdom.
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Descartes thus thinks his scholastic and commonsensical readers suf­
fer a common malady. The false assumptions of each group motivate an 
excessive appeal to souls for the explanation of human behavior. In turn, 
these mistaken assumptions corrupt their efforts to understand the 
behavior of brutes by appeal to analogy.
A related (and mistaken) assumption further corrupts efforts to rea­
son, by analogy, from effects to causes. The assumption has it that each 
kind of behavioral effect results from a unique kind of cause — an 
assumption at work in Montaigne's appeals to the like effects, like causes 
principle. Counterexamples arise in connection with the imitative abili­
ties of machines. Descartes holds that in humans a single kind of behav­
ioral effect (where kinds are individuated in terms of the productive 
result — the overt behavior—rather than the productive process) might 
be triggered by either kind of causal principle: local motion stemming 
from pure mechanics, which for Descartes involves none other than 
blind pushes/collisions; or local motion stemming from the will, a stem 
which provides a distinctive purposive element.12 Though, as Descartes 
conceives them, purely mechanical systems are incapable of the pur­
posive operations afforded by a faculty of reason, he maintains the thesis 
that such systems are able to imitate or exhibit the behavioral effects of 
such operations. Call this the Imitation Thesis. Assuming the Imitation 
Thesis, Montaigne is wrong that a given kind of effect is always matched 
by a single kind of cause. The behavior of the final piece in a chain of 
dominoes may be indistinguishable whether the initial motion of the 
chain is triggered fully mechanically by levers, or intentionally by an 
agent's will (e.g., via the mediation of her limbs).13 The Imitation Thesis 
underscores the difficulties involved in arguing from effects to causes. 
The situation is strongly parallel to that which Descartes confronts in his 
treatments of skepticism. Since (as Descartes holds) the same kind of 
effect — viz. an apparently normal and waking experience — may be
12 To More, Descartes writes: 'There arc two different principles causing our m ove­
ments. The first is purely mechanical and corporeal, and depends solely on the force 
of the spirits and the structure of our organs.... The other, an incorporeal principle, 
is the mind or that soul which I have defined as a thinking substance' (CSMK 365, 
AT 5:27fi).
13 In the Fourth Replies, Descartes writes: 'both in our bodies and those of the brutes,
no movements can occur without the presence of the all the organs or instruments 
which would enable the same movements to be produced in a machine. So even in 
our own case the mind does not directly move the external limbs, but simply 
controls the animal spirits which flow from the heart via die brain into the muscles, 
and set up certain motions in them; for the spirits are by their nature adapted with  
equal facility to a great variety of actions' (CSM 2:1.61, AT 7:229).
I
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caused by dreams or by waking, there are grave problems in establishing 
the true cause solely on the basis of effects.
Difficulties remain. Behavioral similarities at play in the Imitation 
Thesis would appear to undermine not only the Montaigne-style appeal 
to analogy, but also Descartes's. Since we sometimes produce by rea­
soned volition the same kinds of behavioral exhibitions that on other 
occasions are produced in us by pure mechanics, it would seem hopeless 
to try to establish that analogous behavioral exhibitions in brutes are 
always the result of mechanics alone. As will emerge, Descartes is aware 
of the difficulties and thinks he overcomes them.
II Mechanical Causes Are Sufficient To Explain 
Non-reasoned Behavior
Recall premise (1):
(1) Experiments with mechanical physiology establish that purely 
mechanical causes are sufficient to explain all behavior of brutes, 
save that which is apparently reasoned.
Descartes's case for (1) is aimed more at a scholastic audience than a 
commonsensical one: Scholastics already accept the central point of (2), 
namely that brutes lack reason. As I contend, commentators have tended 
to neglect Descartes's treatment of (1), focusing disproportionate atten­
tion on his famous Jtwo tests' (to be discussed in §111). I want now to focus 
on Descartes's case for (1), giving special attention to his anti-scholastic 
moves. This attention anticipates the discussion to come in §IV, where 
I'll address his invocation of the principle of parsimony.
The shift from the natural philosophy of scholasticism to the new 
mechanical philosophy involves an elimination of myriad entities of 
hylomorphic explanation. As Descartes observes (in Principles 4:201), 
explanations in terms of mechanics are 'much better than explaining 
matters by inventing all sorts of strange objects' including (as the French 
edition adds) '"prime matter," "substantial forms" and the whole range 
of qualities that people habitually introduce, all of which are harder to 
understand than the tilings they are supposed to explain' (CSM 1:287, 
AT8a:324n5).w
14 Cf. the World, AT 11:7 and X 1:25-6, for more on how Descartes understands scholas­
tic hylomorphic explanation,
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Descartes distinguishes two sorts of automatistic human behavior, 
both of which he explains by pure mechanics- The one sort is explained 
entirely by the mechanical disposition of our physiological constitution, 
as in Descartes's explanation of 'heartbeat, digestion, nutrition, [and] 
respiration when we are asleep' (CSM 2:161, AT 7:229f; Fourth Replies).15 
The other sort is explained by the mechanical disposition of our physi­
ological constitution in tandem with external, corporeal stimuli, as when 
the hands instinctively protect the head from external injury; in such 
cases, the sense organs transmit a mechanical signal that 'reaches the 
brain and sends the animals spirits [back] into the nerves in the manner 
necessary to produce this movement even without any mental volition, 
just as it would be produced in a machine' (ibid.). For Descartes, an 
approved characterization of either sort of automatistic behavior would 
have it that something is happening to the body, though such happen­
ings are not tinder the occurrent direction of an adjoined soul.
Scholastic theories generally agree with Descartes in characterizing 
both kinds of behavior as automatistic. Unlike Descartes, they hold that 
the automatic processes involved are under the direction of the soul, 
namely tine powers of vegetative and sensitive souls. Heartbeat and 
digestion require the guidance of vegetative souls. And such behavior 
as involves the pursuit of, or flight from, the objects of sense — as when 
sheep flee wolves —requires the powers of sensitive souls.16 The theory 
entails that sensory awareness of the objects of pursuit or flight is as 
indispensable to the production of such behavior as are the physiological 
contributions, themselves under the direction of the soul though they 
involve no cognition (cf. ST la.78.1).
In making his case for (1), part of the difficulty facing Descartes is that 
an appeal to analogy would seem to favor the scholastic theoiy, Intro­
spective reflection on, for instance, our own reaction to wolves, strongly 
suggests (even if misleadingly) that conscious awareness of the wolf is 
an integral part of the correct explanation of our behavioral response.
In Discourse 5, Descartes offers no systematic case for (1). Instead, he 
summarizes relevant highlights from an earlier, unpublished work — 
the Treatise on Man — drawing out its analogical implications (cf. AT 
6:45-6). The earlier work incorporates a thought-experiment involving a 
hypothetical man-machine. Initially, the man is created with only a
15 Cf. the Treatise on Man, AT 11:202, and Passions 16 (AT ll'341f). Though such 
behavior is typically automatistic, it sometimes issues from the soul; Descartes cites 
willful changes Ln respiration (AT 11:197) and pupil adjustment (AT ll'361t).
16 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theotopca {abbreviated ST) (New York: Blackfriars and 
McGraw-Hill 1964-), la.80.1, la. 81.2-3.
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mechanical body, but no soul: 'I suppose [its] body to be nothing but a 
statue or machine made of earth, which God forms with the explicit 
intention of making it as much as possible like us' (CSM 1:99, AT 11:120). 
Though the man-machine lacks all powers of a soul, God nonetheless 
'places inside it all the parts required to make it walk, eat, breathe, and 
indeed to imitate all those of our functions which can be imagined to 
proceed from matter and to depend solely on the disposition of our 
organs' (CSM 1:99, AT 11:120). Descartes's aim is, in part, to convey the 
plausibility of a fully mechanical explanation of the workings and be­
havior of the human body:
1 should like you to consider that these functions follow from, the mere arrangement 
of the machine's organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other 
automaton follow from the arrangement of its conn ter-weights and wheels. In order 
to explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of this machine as 
having any vegetative or sensitive soul or other principle of movement and life, 
apart from [the motion of its physiological parts], (CSM 1:108, AT 11:202)
Descartes thinks his account in the Treatise on Man provides analogical 
evidence in support of (1). Assuming the plausibility of a fully-mechani- 
cal explanation of the man-machine's behavior, a simitar explanation of 
the behavior of brute animals is also plausible. In Discourse 5, Descartes 
writes (referring back to the man-machine of his earlier treatise):
And when 1 looked to see what functions would occur in such a body I found 
precisely those which may occur in us without our thinking of them, and hence 
without any contribution from our soul (that is, from that part of us, distinct from 
the body whose nature, as f have said previously, is simply to think). (CSM 1:134, 
AT 6:46}
As the text continues, Descartes draws out the intended analogical 
implication. The functions occurring in the man-machine
are all those in which it may be said that brutes resemble us without [the benefit of 
a faculty of] reason: without which [faculty of] reason, I could find none of those 
functions which, being dependent on thought, are the only ones which belong to us 
as [real] men; whereas I found all these later, having supposed that God created a 
rational soul, and that he joined it to this body in the particular nianner which I 
described. (AT 6:46; my translation)
Two aspects of the implied analogical reasoning deserve comment. 
First, Descartes leaves unclarified the kinds of behavior of 'which it may 
be said that brutes resemble us without: reason' and are thus subject to a 
fully mechanical explanation. This is not surprising given the diversity of 
his intended audience. For the scholastic reader, the relevant kinds in­
clude all behavior of brutes. For the commonsensical reader, a significant
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proportion of the behavior of brutes is thought to be under the direction 
of the organism's own reason. In any case, to whatever extent the reader 
supposes that a faculty of reason is at play, the later argument of Discourse 
5 (that expressed in [2]) is intended to show otherwise. Second, the 
analogical implication should not be overestimated. Descartes says, of 
the human bodily movements on which he builds the analogy, that they 
'may' (peuvent) — but not that they always do — 'occur in us without our 
thinking about them.' Consequently, the intended conclusion (at this 
early stage of the argument, at any rate) is no stronger than that the 
analogous behavior of brutes may occur in them without their thinking 
about them. As (1) conveys, purely mechanical causes are sufficient to 
explain a wide range of the behavior of brutes; it does not follow (not 
without additional assumptions), however, that such causes provide the 
correct explanation. Nonetheless, if Descartes can establish (1), it follows 
that consciousness in brutes is needed to explain theirbehavior only if the 
behavior is apparently reasoned. To explain unreasoned behavior, ap­
peals to sensory consciousness are unneeded. More generally, scholastic 
vegetative and sensitive souls are explanatorily superfluous.
Notwithstanding its importance to Descartes's larger aims, the paltry 
extent to which a case for (1) is made in Discourse 5 (quite unlike the 
detailed treatment of the man-machine in the Treatise on M an)17 amounts 
to little more than a promissory note as to the explanatory completeness 
of mechanical physiology. The only physiological mechanical workings 
he writes about relate to the heart and circulation, leaving it to the reader 
to extrapolate the remaining details (cf. AT 6:46-7). This would seem to 
be a critical mistake. For a scholastic audience, there is no easy extrapo­
lation from the mechanical explanation of circulation to a similar exp la-
17 In his Treatise on Man, Descartes shows special interest in explaining seemingly
purposive external behavior. For instance, he writes that 'the effect of [corporeal] 
memory here tha t seems to me the most worthy to be considered consists in this, 
that without there being any soul in this machine, it can naturally be disposed to 
imitate all the movements of real men, or other similar machines' (AT 11:185). The 
account then unfolds (AT 11:185-197) with Descartes explaining how mechanical 
physiology alone can account for a variety of behavior appropriate to various 
stimuli, via a wholly reflex mechanism, including: complex eye adjustments, and 
the corresponding corporeal signals sent to the brain; behavior in which the move­
ments of the limbs, the head, and the eyes, are coordinated (e.g. when die hand is 
burned, the reflexive response includes tears, a wrinkling of the face, and a dispo­
sition of the voice to cry (AT ll:192f)); behavior that 'serves to pursue desirable 
things, or to avoid the harmful' (AT 11:193); behavior flint in real men serves only 
'to manifest the passions' (A fAjioiratr Ik passions) (AT 11:194), including laughing 
and crying; leg movements requisite to walking (AT 11:1961); and much more.
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nation of behavior for which sensory awareness is regarded as essential. 
In further support of (1), Descartes does also note that the purely me­
chanical account
will not seem at all strange to those who know how many kinds of automatons, or 
moving machines, the skill of man can construct with the use of very few parts, in 
comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and 
all the other parts that are in the body of any animal. For they will regard this body 
as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better 
ordered than any machine that can be devised by man, and contains in itself 
movements mare wonderful than those in any such machine. (CSM 1:139, AT 
6:55-6)m
But the persuasiveness of this appeal would be lost on those not already 
versed in mechanical explanations — those for whom the comparison of 
muscles, nerves, and arteries, to levers, pulleys, and wheels, would be 
strange.
Today's reader is apt to miss the significance of the fact that, in his 
Discourse treatment, Descartes mostly asserts (1) rather than arguing for 
it. From our vantage point, the explanatory power of mechanical physi­
ology {an updated version, of course) is more or less taken for granted. 
But for Descartes's commonsensical and scholastic readers, this is a 
grave omission and helps explain some of the objections he was to 
encounter — objections to the effect that the powers of a sensitive soul 
{or sensory awareness, at any rate) arc needed to explain the behavior of 
brutes. Among these is the following criticism represented by Arnauld, 
in the Fourth Objections:
I fear that this view [the bile machine doctrine] will not succeed in finding acceptance 
in people's minds unless it is supported by very solid arguments. For at first sight 
it seems incredible that it can come about, without the assistance of any soul, that 
the light reflected from the body of a wolf onto the eyes of a sheep should move the 
minute fibres of the optic nerves, and that on reaching the brain the motion should 
spread the animal spirits throughout the nerves in the manner necessary to precipi­
tate the sheep's flight. (CSM 2:144, AT 7:21)5)
The sixth objectors add:
So far are w e from accepting that all [the behavior of brutes] can be satisfactorily 
explained by means of mechanics, without invoking any sensation, life or sou i, that 
we are willing to wager anything you like that this is an impossible and ridiculous 
claim. (CSM 2:279, AT 7:414)
18 Cf. the Tmiiisewi Man, AT 11:131f, and the thought-experimentin the letter of April 
or May 1638 (to Reneri for Pollot).
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III Mechanical Causes Provide the Best Explanation 
of Apparently Reasoned Behavior
Assuirungpremise(l), all butthe apparently reasoned behavior ofbrutes 
can be explained by pure mechanics. In the 10th and 11th paragraphs of 
Discourse 5 (and other parallel writings), Descartes makes his case for (2):
(2) Experiments with the behavior of humans and baites establish 
that the apparently reasoned behavior of brutes is best explained 
as deriving from purely mechanical causes, not a faculty of rea­
son.
Again, Descartes's project is best understood as analogical. The primary 
aim of the present Section is to understand why he holds that all appar­
ently reasoned behavior of brutes is best understood as analogous to 
purely mechanical human behavior — why we should judge that none 
of it stems from reason.
The remainder of §3 is organized as follows. In §111.1,1 lay the ground­
work for my claim that the two tests are negative tests. In §111.2,1 clarify 
what Descartes means by 'reasoned behavior', hi §§IIL3 through III.5,1 
explain and defend my interpretation of the two tests as special cases of 
a negative test that I call an unmasking test, In §111.6,1 offer brief remarks 
about Descartes's view of language as the possiblebasis of a positive test.
1. Descartes on what machines cannot do
In the tenth paragraph of Discourse 5, Descartes extends his discussion 
of the hypothetical man-machine. Generalizing to all machines, he ex­
plains two tests for exposing machines as machines, based on what 
machines cannot do:
If any such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as 
closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should stil] have two very certain 
means of recognizing that they were not real men. The first is that they could never 
use words, or put together other signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to 
others.... It is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrange­
ments of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is 
said in its presence, as the dullest of men can do. Secondly, even though such 
machines might do some things as well as wedothem, or perhaps even better, they 
would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not 
through understanding but only from the disposition of their organs. For whereas 
reason is a universal instrument which can be used In all kinds of situations, these 
organs need some particular disposition for each particular action; hence it is for all 
practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to 
make it act In all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us 
act, (CSM 1:139-40, AT 6:56-7)
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Since the two tests are supposed to derive from what machines cannot 
do, a clarification is in order as to what precisely Descartes takes as the 
relevant impossibility. On this count, the passage can be read in two 
ways. It can be read as referring to the kinds of exhibitions of behavior 
that are impossible for machines to produce. It can also be read as 
referring to the kinds of processes by which it is impossible for machines 
to produce an exhibition of behavior, (The two kinds of readings are not 
mutually exclusive.) As I want to suggest, the passage is best read in the 
second way, as referring (exclusively) to constraints on the kinds of 
productive processes available to machines. In the present section, I'll 
defend my reading based on its plausibility in the context of the above 
passage. In §§UI.3 through HL5, the reading will emerge as superior 
based on the details of the examples Descartes develops in other pas­
sages.
On my reading, Descartes is not denying that machines can exhibit 
sophisticated language-like behavior— as (/signifying genuine thought. 
What he denies is that machines can, in fact, use words in  order to refer 
to objects of thought: machines, in that they lack thought, 'could never 
use words, or put together other signs, as we do in order [pour] to declare 
our thoughts to others' (CSM 1:140, AT 6:56; italics added).19 Explana­
tions in terms of final causality provide the wrong model for under­
standing purely mechanical behavior. As he conceives of machines, it is 
strictly impossible for them to adapt means (qua means) to ends (qua 
ends), appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.
In addition to this claim about strict impossibility, I take Descartes to 
be making a separate claim about what is impractical. The range of 
human behavior that machines are able to mimic is owed to the com­
plexity of their mechanical predispositions. He thus regards it as 'prac­
tically impossible' (mora lenient impossible) — though he does not say 
metaphysical!}/ impossible — for a machine with the limitations of the 
hypothetical man-machine to have enough predispositions to perfectly 
imitate everything that our reason enables us to do (AT 6:57). Though 
Descartes is less than clear, I take him to be alluding to the anatomical 
limitations that stem from being constructed so as to mimic die appear­
ance and behavior of real humans — thus moving with two legs, work­
ing with two hands, producing sounds in the way we do, and so on. But 
it is not credible that he would intend a clarification of the kinds of
19 For Descartes, the mechanical workings in question — qua modes of body — would 
not even be 'signs' were they not so regarded by a mind. Cf. f.R. Searle, The 
Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1992), who makes a similar 
point about symbols and syntax (ch. 9).
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machines that are practically impossible—say, for us to create— to shed 
light on the kinds of machines that God did in fact create — much less on 
the kinds of machines that God could create.20 Indeed, while charac­
terizing his hypothetical man-machine, Descartes writes:
We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other such machines which, although 
only man-made, have the power to move of their own accord in many different 
ways. But I am supposing this machine to be made by the hands of God, and so I 
think you may reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of movements than 
I could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting more artistry than I could possibly 
ascribe to it. (CSM 1:99, AT 11:120)
As I read him, then, Descartes does indeed maintain that there are 
limitations in what machines can do. But producing impressive exhibi­
tions of behavior is not among these limitations.
The position I attribute to Descartes is not the naive view that every 
machine can imitate every kind of human behavior. To the contrary, less 
complex machines might be unable to exhibit sophisticated behavior. 
But insofar as a machine does lack some imitative ability, this inability 
would be owed to its particular design rather than to essential con­
straints on any possible machine. It would be possible {surely 
metaphysically possible, for God) to build a more complex machine that 
would exhibit the behavior in question,21 
So understood, Descartes cannot be said to have underestimated the 
imitative abilities of machines. His views turn out far more sophisticated 
than some commentators have supposed.21
20 In Principles 4:205, Descartes characterizes morally certain matters as 'having suffi­
cient certainty for application to ordinary life, even though they may be uncertain 
in relation to the absolute power of God' (CSM 1:289-90, AT8a:327).
21 Given standard mechanist doctrines that Descartes helped establish — whereby all 
possible variety of secondary quality ideas can be produced (in slimulus-response 
fashion) by none other than variations of corporeal motion — he surely did not 
underestimate the potential indefiniteness in the variety of output responses that 
can be mapped to sequences of just a few kinds of input stimuli (cf. Principles 2:23). 
Note, too, that given the implications of his non-atoniist version of mechanism, it is 
unlikely that Descartes underestimates the potential for miniaturization in ma­
chines (cf. Principles 2:20,2:34-5).
22 In contrast withmy reading, Cottingham's reading of Discourse 5 commits Descartes 
to assumptions about the abilities of machines that, says Cottingham, we today 
know to be false ('Cartesian Dualism,' 250).
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2. Descartes on 'reasoned’ behavior — strictly speaking
A further refinement is in order, concerning Descartes's conception of 
reasoned behavior. There is some sense in which even purely mechanical 
behavior might be reasoned, or purposive. Let's then distinguish this 
weaker sense of the term, from the strict sense to which Descartes refers 
in his claims about what machines cannot do.
Descartes denies that machines have the ability to behave in order to 
pursue their own ends. He does not thereby deny that they might behave 
in accordance with an end, nor that their behavior might help bring about 
an end. Yet both of these cases involve a kind of purposiveness. Descartes 
sometimes alludes to such quasi-teleological elements of mechanical 
behavior by appeal to the purposes of the machine's designer (cf. AT 
7;84f, 6:55f, 11:120), or those of the machine's user (cf. AT 7:84f) — themes 
also discussed by Aquinas.^ While rebutting an objection to the effect 
that 'various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs' (all of whom he 
denies a rational soul) exhibit 'wonderful instances of sagacity' even to 
the extent of appearing 'as though reasoning by way of exclusion' (ST 
Ia2£e.l3.2), Aquinas writes:
[A]ll the things moved by reason display the order of reason [orrio rativws], though 
they themselves are without reason, for instance, an archer flights an arrow and it 
goes straight to the target as though it were itself endowed with a directing reason 
[rational! dirigentcm}. The same appeal's in the movement of clocks and other works 
of human art. Now artificial works are to human art as all natural things are to d ivine 
art. And so, like the things made by human ingenuity, the things moved by nature 
display an order, as observed in [Aristotle's] Physics. Hence the examples of sagacity 
in animal behavior are from a natural inclination to catty out the intricate processes 
planned by supreme art. That is why we call some animals clever or intelligent, not 
because they are endowed with reason or choice. (ST la te , 13.2)
There are, then, at least two different senses in which a behavior may 
be reasoned or purposive, In the one sense, the behavior issues from an 
occurrent, conscious volition of the behave r. Call such behavior 'rea­
soned,' and 'purposivei'— such reasons and purposes being consciously 
entertained by the behaver. Since the archer's arrow lacks a conscious 
mind, its behavior could not be reasonedi/purposivei. Likewise, the 
behavior of the circulatory and digestive systems of the human body is 
not typically reasoned] / purposive], but is instead (what Descartes calls) 
purely mechanical. I might form an occurrent volition to tire effect that
23 Though of course via his hylomorphic conception of the beings Descartes regards 
as pure machines.
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my blood will continue to circulate normally, but given that such con­
tinuance does not issue from  my volition, nor is my circulatory system 
'itself endowed with a directing reason' (to use Aquinas's way of putting 
it), tills is not reasonedi behavior. There is, however, another sense in 
which the behavior of the archer's arrow is reasoned and purposive: 
namely, the sense in which it accords with, and indeed helps bring about, 
the purposes of the archer. Similarly, our circulatory and digestive 
systems are marvelously purposive, but their purposiveness is owed 
{according to Descartes) to their creator.21 More generally, the reasonsi 
and purposesi of designers are at play in the behavior of the well-func­
tioning machines they design. Call such behavior 'reasoned^' and 'pur­
posive:' — there being reasonsi/purposesi because of which the 
behavior occurs, though they are not the behaver's own.
As I understand Descartes's account, purely mechanical behavior is 
reasoned;, but not reasonedi. An organism's own consciousness is inte­
gral to producing reasonedi behavior, but such consciousness (if there 
be any) is idle in the production of its purely mechanical behavior.25
The classification of behavior — as reasoned] versus purely mechani­
cal — is often difficult. In some cases the difficulty steins from a wholly 
genetic role for reasoni. Consider that in the normal course of driving a 
car I do not consciously attend to the purposive way in which my limbs 
coordinate the accelerator, clutch, and gear shift. Such limb movements 
do not issue from any conscious, occurrent volition of mine, even though 
the disposition from which they do issue was acquired with the help of 
previous such volition — past, repeated instances of reasonedi behavior 
(i.e. conditioning, in the relevant sense)26 Since occurrent volition does 
not factor into the production of acquired reflex behavior of this sort,
24 For Descartes, all purely mechanical behavior displays the order and purpose of the 
divine will. In his Sixth Meditation discussion of dropsy error, Descartes notes that 
even where machines (whether docks or physiological systems) appear to be mal­
functioning, they behave in accordance with theii God-given natures (AT 7:83ff).
25 The distinction between reasoned] and reasoned^ behavior is similar to, but not 
exactly the distinction between acting on a reason and acting in accordance with a 
reason. As I mean to construe it, reasoned; behavior is not merely in accordance with 
reason — not merely reasonnWe. Rather, there is a sense in which such behavior 
occurs because of a reason — it is reasoned — though the guiding reasons are not the 
tocJt/iwr's own.
26 In other cases, the disposition is acquired without any volitional contribution from 
the behaver. In a 1630 letter, Descartes describes what he regards as such a case: 'I
reckon that if you whipped a dog five or six times to the sound of a violin, it would 
begin to howl and run away as soon as it heard that music again' {CSMK 20, AT 
1:34).
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Descartes classifies it as 'purely mechanical' {cf. AT 7:229f) — a sort that 
he thinks includes some cases of walking, talking, singing, and more (cf. 
AT 4:573,7:229f, 11:362,11:368-70). In contrast, commonsensical classi­
fications of such behavior are more apt to track a behavior's apparent 
subtlety. Where purely mechanical behavior appears very subtle, it's 
perhaps inevitable that we'd describe it in terms apropos of reasoned] 
behavior — e.g. in terms of the behaver's own occurrent beliefs, desires, 
and the like. Front Descartes's standpoint such descriptions are, strictly 
speaking, no more than a fagon de pavler.
3. Unmasking an automatism as an automatism
Let us assume with Descartes that machines cannot engage in reasonedi 
behavior, though they can exhibit it. Descartes's two tests are designed 
to unmask some (but not all) such exhibitions of behavior as automat­
isms, as I want now to explain.27
The following classification scheme will help to clarify the account:
(A) exhibitions of behavior that are implausible to explain as other 
than reasonedi;
(B) exhibitions of behavior that are implausible to explain as other 
than purely mechanical;
(C) exhibitions of behavior that, prima facie, are plausibly explained 
as reasoned] or as purely mechanical; two cases:
(i) the behavior is unmasked as type (B), upon further experi­
ment;
(ii) the behavior is not unmasked upon further experiment.
So construed, the divisions between categories are cpisleinic: judgments 
concerning whether a given behavior belongs in, say, type (C) rather than 
type (A), depend on one's beliefs as to the explanatory power of mechani­
cal physiology. Descartes has various arguments intended topersuadehis
27 An analogical argument focusing on behavior would seem to offer the most prom­
ising strategy available to Descartes. Granting his substance dualism (among our 
assumptions, for purposes of understanding ilia project), there's no possibility of 
identifying structures of the central nervous system in humans in which conscious­
ness resides, so as to infer to the existence or non-existence of consciousness in brutes 
based on the presence or lack of similar sudi structures.
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readers to classify, as type (C), many forms of behavior that they'd have 
previously classified as type (A).23 Given the interpretive aims of the 
present Section, I shall assume the success of such arguments.
Consider (A). In claiming that Descartes's two tests are intended only 
as negative tests of reasoni, I mean to rule out the conclusion that a 
behavior is of type (A) as a possible outcome of the tests.29 Bear in mind 
that abehavior may fcereasonedi while not falling into type (A). In §111.6, 
I shall return to a discussion of category (A) and whether it includes any 
human behavior. For now, suffice it to say that Descartes includes no 
behavior ofbrutes in type (A).
Consider (B). Descartes thinks that vast numbers of brutes exhibit 
none other than purely mechanical behavior as falls under (B). He takes 
it as implausible to deny that brutes 'such as oysters and sponges' 
(CSMK 304, AT 4:576), or 'worms, flies, caterpillars and other [such] 
animals move like machines' (CSMK 366, AT 5:277). Bear in mind, 
Descartes does not purport to establish the bSte machine doctrine with 
metaphysical certainty. And insofar as we're to argue by analogy, he 
thinks the behavior of such organisms is akin to that of our circulatory 
or respiratory systems, or perhaps the statues at the Royal Gardens at 
Saint-Germain whose motion he attributes to a hydro-mechanism (cf. AT 
11:1300.
Consider (C), the interesting category for our purposes. As I interpret 
Descartes, much of the behavior of brutes belongs in this categoiy, But 
he thinks that careful experiment and reflection reveal that all of the type
(C) behavior of bmtes is also of type (Ci) — thus, resolving ultimately 
into type (B). In a 1646 letter, he writes:
28 Discourse 5 is weak in this regard, though, in his past-Discottrse writings, Dcscartes 
improves. For example, in the Fourth Replies ha offers the following argument: 
'When people take a fall, and stick out their hands so as to protect their head, it is 
not reason that instructs them to do this; it is simply that the sight of the impending 
fall reaches the brain and sends the animal spirits into the nerves in the manner 
necessary to produce this movement even without any mental volition, just as it 
would be produced in a machine' (CSM 2:161, AT 7:229-30). Elsewhere, Descartes 
strengthens the introspective force of the argument, adding that 'even if we ex­
pressly willed rot to put our hands in front of our head when we fall, we could not 
prevent ourselves' (CSMK 302-03, AT 4:573; cf. also Passions 13).
29 Hie standard interpretation of Descartes has it that his two tests are intended to 
yield either a positive or a negative outcome — i.e., that they are intended to reveal 
whether onm t a behavior is reasoned,. Cf. Bennett, 'Thoughtful Brutes,' 199; Chom­
sky, Cartesian Linguistics, 78n.9; Cottingham, 'Cartesian Dualism,' 250; Radner and 
Rndner, Animat Consciousness, 41; Rozemond, 'The Role of the Intellect,' 99; and 
Wilson, 'Animal Ideas,' 12, all of whom are committed to the claim that Descartes 
intends the tests as both positive and negative tests.
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I know that animals do many things better than we do, but this does not surprise 
me. It can even be used to prove they act naturally and mechanically, like a clock 
which tells the time better than our judgment does. (CSMK 304, AT 4:575)™
ft is in connection with type (Ci) behavior that unmaskings occur — 
impressive exhibitions of behavior which, on closer inspection, are best 
explained as purely mechanical.
Unmaskings rest on what I shall refer to as the Universal Instrument 
Thesis. As Descartes writes, 'reason is a universal instrument which can 
be used in all kinds of situations'31 (CSM 1:140, AT 6:57). I take his 
unmasking strategy to arise from the following, partly analogical con­
siderations. As revealed in part by experience, reasoni allows us to adapt 
an indefinite variety of means in the pursuit of an indefinite variety of 
ends, in an indefinite variety of contexts. This universal adaptability of 
reasoni affords us the ability to confront new, even unique challenges 
with new tactics specially devised for such pm-poses. Notably, we're able 
to use our anatomy in order to signify indefinitely many meanings. 
Though no machine can produce signing behavior in order to achieve an 
end, this inability might remain masked in machines that are adept at 
mimicking the relevant behavioral result. But in machines that are inept 
in this regard, their lack of reasoni — their lack of universal adaptability
— might be exposed in a manner that unmasks their behavior as me* 
chanical.
On my account, Descartes's two tests involve two kinds of uranask- 
ings. Before turning to his own treatment, consider an example of 
category (Ci) behavior stemming from recent experiments with wasps, 
an example that is arguably more perspicuous than any that Descartes 
explains:'2
When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphcxbuilds a burrow for the purpose 
and seeks out a cricket which she stings in sucli a way as to paralyze but not kill it. 
She drags the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, 
then flies away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs 
feed off the paralyzed cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the wasp
30 Descartes's early notebooks record related thoughts: 'The high degree of perfection 
displayed in some oi their actions makes us suspect that animals do not have free 
will'(CSM 1:5, AT 10:219).
31 He adds, 'spirits are by their nature adapted with equaI facility to a great variety of 
actions' (CSM 2:161, AT 7:229)
32 The example is cited by D. Dennett, 'Mechanism and Responsibility,' in T. Hon- 
derich, ed., Essays on Freedom and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Hall 1973), 
who uses it to illustrate a rather different point
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equivalent of deep freeze. To the human mind, such an elaborately organized and 
seemingly purposeful routine conveys a convincing flavor of logic and thoughtful­
ness — until more details are examined. For example, the wasp's routine is to bring 
the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that 
all is well, merge, and then drag the cricket in. If, while the wasp is inside making 
her preliminary inspection, the cricket is moved a few inches away, the wasp, on 
emerging from the burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not 
inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see 
that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the 
wasp is inside, once again the wasp will move the cricket up to the threshold and 
reenter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket 
straight in. On one occasion, this procedure was repeated forty times, always with 
the same result.'’'
Where a behavior is reasonedi, the Universal Instrument Thesis renders 
it incredible that the organism would fail to use reasoni to devise new  
means of achieving its intended ends. Of course, various explanations 
might be devised to maintain the hypothesis that such behavior is 
reasonedi, but Descartes thinks that the more plausible explanation 
(insofar as analogically grounded) is that such exhibitions of behavior 
stem from a purely mechanical process in which the needed adaptation 
is lacking.
Unmasking strategies can be characterized in the form of a reductio ad 
abswdutn. An animal exhibits apparently reasoned) behavior. Assume the 
behavior is reasonedi. The Universal Instrument Thesis warrants the 
prediction that the organism will exhibit a wide range of other reasonedi 
behavior (i.e. of that behavior that it lias an anatomical capacity to 
perform).3-1 Experiments intended to elicit the predicted behavior sys­
tematically fail to do so. To avoid absurdity, the assumption is denied. 
The original behavior is unmasked.35
Given Descartes's own examples, he does not require that unmaskings 
take the precise form, as occurs in the wasp example, nor that the results
33 D.E, Wooldridge, The Macliineiy of the Brain (New York: McGraw-Hill 1963), 82-3
34 The parenthetical qualification is crucial, as it is unreasonable to expect behavior for 
which the organism is anatomically unfit. In some passages, Descartes shows a 
sensitivity to such concerns (cf. AT 6:57f, AT 4:575).
35 There is a weak and a strong reading as to the immediate conclusion we're to draw
from an unmasking. On the weak reading, an unmasking shows that the behavior in
question is not reasoned,. On the strong reading, it shows that th ebeltfwer in question 
lacks a faculty of reason—because (as this reading would have it) any organism in 
possession of a faculty of reason would employ it in die scenarios at play in the 
unmasking. Though there are some textual grounds for the stronger reading, I
believe (hat Descartes is best interpreted according to die weak reading.
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be as palpable; nor does he hold that it is practically possible to unmask 
every machine. The automatism of extraordinarily complex machines 
might be such as to elude even the most ingenious attempts (by humans) 
at being unmasked, thus resolving into category (Cii) behavior. What all 
successful unmaskings have in common is the exhibition of behavior 
seeming to stem from the organism's own reasons and purposes — i.e., 
'until more details are examined.'
Dramatic unmaskings might occur ill connection with behavior that, 
prima facie, surpasses that of humans. Montaigne had a quite different 
view of apparently superior behavior in brutes. Objecting on analogical 
grounds, he asks: 'Why do we attribute to somesor t of natural and servile 
inclination these works which surpass all that we can do by nature and 
by art?' (333) In a revised edition of the 'Apology' his view is conveyed 
in an embellishment of the like effects, like causes principle:3*
There is no apparent reason to judge that the beasts do by natural and obligatory 
instinct the same things that w e do by one choice and cleverness. We must infer 
from like results like faculties, und from  richer results, richer faculties, and conse­
quently confess that this same reason, this same method that we have for working, 
die animals have it also, or some belter atw .^  (336-7; italics added)
Descartes offers a very different analysis:
It is also very remarkable that, although many animals might show more ingenuity 
[ tf  Industrie] than we do in some of their actions, they nonetheless show none at all 
in many others: so that w hat they do  better does not prove that they have a mind 
[I’esprit] — for, in that case, they would have more [ingenuity] than any of us and 
would do better in all things — bu t rather [it proves) that they have none at all, (AT 
6:58-5^; my translation1*)
36 The superiority of the behavior of brutes is among Montaigne's central themes: 'we 
recognize easily enough, ill most of their works, how much superiority the animals 
have over us and how feeble is our skill to imitate them' (333).
37 The italicized remarks were added to the 1595 edition of Montaigne's Essays. The 
changes signal no more than a shift in emphasis, as they are entailed by the original 
version of the causal principle, namely, from like effects, like causes.
38 The passage poses translation difficulties because of the ambiguous reference in 
connection with the remark, ‘car, ii cc cotupte, its eti auraieni plus qu 'n iiaw  de nous.' 
(They would have more of w hat than any of us?) Most translations take the remark 
to refer back to 'esprit,' thus resulting in the aw kward claim that brutes would have 
more mind than any of us. (I can make no clear sense of the claim that 'x  has more 
mind than y,') CSM avoids this, b u t only with the somewhat strained translation of 
esprit as 'intelligence.' I lake the referent to be 'Industrie,' resulting in a very natural 
translation (albeit too literal) in connection w ith my unmasking interpretation — 
brutes w ould have more ingenuity than any of us.
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This analysis suggests a revision to Montaigne's causal principle (though 
even this is m isleading):/^ richer effects, purely mechanical causes. What 
Descartes regards as incredible is not that machines should outperform 
reasoning, humans — recall him saying, 'I know that animals do many 
things better than we do, but this does not surprise m e/ What is incred­
ible is that a being who regularly performed such feats using reason, 
would fail to adapt it in a variety of contexts. Descartes takes the 
available empirical data to show that brutes 'surpass us only in those of 
our actions which are not guided by our thought' (CSMK 302, AT 
4:573)m '
An important consequence of the present interpretation warrants 
clarification. One kind of strategy (one Descartes thinks is wrong­
headed) for ascertaining the underlying causes of a behavior involves a 
simple pass-oi -fail test based on the degree of subtlety of exhibited 
behavior: where the behavioral subtlety is above a (presumably arbi­
trary) threshold, the behavior is judged as reasoned,; where below, it is 
judged as purely mechanical. Descartes must reject this approach in view  
of the Imitation Thesis, a thesis that allows for dual kinds of causes of a 
given level of apparent subtlety. On my interpretation, there is no case 
in which Descartes judges the behavior of brutes as purely mechanical 
on the basis of any such pass-or-fail test. Where behavior is none other 
than type (B), it is correct that he judges it purely mechanical because of 
falling below a threshold of sorts;40 but it is not a threshold above which 
the same behavior would fall into type (A). And where a behavior is 
unmasked, it would miss the point entirely to say that Descartes's 
conclusion stems from setting the passing grade threshold (for what 
counts as 'apparently reasoned,') too high. Type (Ci) behavior (i.e. that 
which is unmasked) does appear reasoned,; exhibiting impressive behav­
ior is a prerequisite to an unmasking.
Descartes's two tests —Ills two kinds of unmaskings — both draw on 
the hypothetical man-machine thought-experiment introduced earlier in
39 It s worth noting that Descartes intended to run further experiments but evidently 
never found time. In a 1645 letter (probably) to the Marquess of Newcastle Des­
cartes writes; The treatise on animals, on which I began work more than fifteen 
years ago, cannot be finished until I have made many observations which are 
essential for its completion, and which I have not yet had the opportunity to make 
(nor do I know when I shall have it)' {CSMK 274, AT 4326). Essentially the same 
point is made to More (AT 5:344), in the penultimate year of Descartes's life,
40 Though this need not be arbitrary where such behavior (cf. oysters) is well below
any plausible threshold range*
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connection with (1). The one is based on linguistic behavior; the other on 
non-linguistic behavior, as in the wasp example. I now consider each.
4. The linguistic unmasking test
Further reflection on the hypothetical man-machine suggests linguistic 
unmasking strategies based on the kinds of linguistic behavior it would 
be adept at imitating. What are these more easily imitated kinds of 
linguistic behavior? Where human language occurs in reactive contexts, 
namely those in which it is responsive to external stimuli {linguistic or 
otherwise), it is amenable to perfect imitation by a suitably designed 
stimulus-response machine. Descartes indeed portrays a hypothetical 
'talking' automaton that exhibits a limited degree of such responsive­
ness:
We can certainly conceive of a machine st> construc ted that it utters words, and even 
utters words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs (e.g. 
if you touch it in one spot it asks w hat you want of it, if you touch it in another it 
cries out that you are hurting it, and so on). (CSM 1:140, AT 6:56)
Descartes often characterizes these reactive contexts in terms of the 
passions'-4'
And we must not confuse speech w ith the natural movements which express 
passions and which can be imitated by machines as well as by animals. (CSM 
1:140-1, AT 6:58)
Even in us all the motions of our limbs which accompany our passions are caused 
not by the soul but simply by the machinery of the body. The wagging of a dog's 
tail is only a movement accompanying a passion, and so is to be sharply distin­
guished, in my view, from speech. (CSMK 374, AT 5:344-5)
In contrast, Descartes notes what a mechanical signer could not do. 
Again, he locates the inability of a machine in its means of behavior 
production, not in the degree of apparent subtlety of the behavior 
produced. Though the mechanical signer could exhibit language-like 
behavior, it is 'not conceivable7 that it should produce such strings of 
words 'so as [pour] to give an appropriately meaningful answer to
41 In Passions 21 and 25, Descartes explains that he uses 'passion' with dual reference. 
In discussions related to brutes and  consciousness, he uses the term in (w hat he 
calls) the more general sense, roughly the sense whereby our passions are those 
occurrences that happen to us purely mechanically, rather than being made to 
happen by our thought (cf. Passions 1).
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whatever is said in its presence' (CSM 1:140, AT 6:56-7; my italics). 
Whereas reasoni enables new meaningful word combinations to be 
generated via consideration of word meanings, a machine can generate 
only those combinations for which it is mechanically programmed. And 
since machines lack thought, they are incapable of stimulus-free expres­
sion of their thoughts.
Of course, we can imagine a machine that is cleverly designed to 
initiate language-like behavior in a seemingly stimulus-free manner. It 
periodically begins conversations that are not triggered by environ­
mental stimuli. But this possibility does not undermine Descartes's case. 
His case depends on the thesis that some machines can be unmasked, 
but not on the thesis that every machine can. For those machines with 
design limitations of a particular sort, appropriate empirical investiga­
tion might unmask their exhibitions of language-like behavior by expos­
ing behavioral patterns that are best explained as the effects of purely 
mechanical processes.
In devising a strategy Descartes builds on the thought that, where an 
organism exhibits language-like behavior only in stimulus-dependent 
contexts, this is symptomatic of a lack of reasoning] faculties. Recall that 
unmaskings take the form of a reductio. Given: brutes exhibit language­
like behavior of type (C). Assume that such signing is indeed reasoned] 
behavior.42 Given the Universal Instrument Thesis, the brutes in question 
should also exhibit stimulus-free expressions of thought. As Descartes 
observes:
Since dogs and some other animals express their passions to us, they would express 
their [non-passionate] thoughts also if they had any. (CSMK 303, AT 4:575)
Descartes takes it that human language users (on whom the analogy 
rests) routinely express thoughts that are not palpably dependent on 
corporeal stimuli. Yet, according to Descartes, there is no credible evi­
dence of such behavior in brutes. In a letter to More, he notes that
animals easily communicate to us, by voice or bodily movement, their natural 
impulses of anger, fear, hunger and so on.43 Yet in spite of all these facts, it has never
42 In effect, assume with Montaigne that the signing of 'blackbirds, ravens, magpies, 
and parrots,' and other brutes, 'testifies that they have an inward power of reason' 
(cf. 339-40). Montaigne extends his position to all manner of bodily signs, not just 
verbal ones (332). Descartes would have us extend our assumption to the same (cf. 
AT 6:53,4:574).
43 Prima fade, this remark implies that Descartes does not mean to deny brutes such 
consciousness states as anger, fear, hunger, and the like. I shall return to this in §IV.l.
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been observed that any brute anim al attained the perfection of using real speech, 
that is to say, of indicating by w ord or sign something relating to thought alone and 
not to natural impulse. (CSMK 366, AT 5:278)
Ln the Newcastle letter, he adds that 'there has never been known an 
animal [non-human] so perfect as to use a sign to make other animals 
understand something which bore no relation to its passions' (CSMK 
303, AT 4:575). I take Descartes to mean/ in these passages, that the 
language-like behavior we observe in brute animals always arises in 
obviously stimulus-dependent contexts. Assuming that Descartes is 
right,44 the initial assumption is discredited.45 The apparently linguistic 
behavior turns out better explained as purely mechanical.46
On one kind of objection, the better explanation of the lack of (what 
Descartes would countenance as) 'real speech' is not that brutes lack 
reason^ but that they lack the anatomical features needed for signing. 
Descartes anticipates the objection while pressing analogical considera­
tions:
This [lack of non-passion ate signing] does not happen because they lack the neces­
sary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet 
they cannot speak as we do: that is, they cannot show that they are thinking what 
they are saying. On the other hand, men bom  deaf and dumb, and  thus deprived 
of speech-organs as much as the beasts or even more so, normally invent their own 
signs to make themselves understood by those who, being regularly in their 
company, have the time to learn their language. (CSM 1:140, AT 6:57-8)
On another kind of objection, Descartes is guilty of special pleading. 
He requires that brutes exhibit stimulus-free instances of language-like
44 Bennett (202-6) offers an interesting overview of some recent experimental w ork (by 
David Premack, et al.) that purports to establish that brutes exhibit stimulus-free 
signing behavior. Among other things, the discussion highlights the difficulties 
involved in establishing signs as stimulus-free.
45 Descartes does not deny that mechanical systems m ay incorporate— w hat is, from 
the point of view of their designer— signaling. Pie indeed characterizes Hie motions 
of animal spirits in our nerves as signals (cf. AT 7:86ff), though of course purely 
corporeal signals.
46 Ii\ significant respects, the procedure is similar to Alan Turing's Imitation Game. 
See A. Turing, 'Computing M achinery and Intelligence,' M ind  59 (1950) 433-60. But 
where Turing's test aims at unm asking the causes of an exhibition of behavior as 
involving thinking (i.e. insofar as the notion of thinking, on his view, is to be 
meaningful), Descartes's tests aim  at unmasking the causes as purely mechanical 
(I should add that there is no easy w ay to link Turing's concept of thinking  w ith  any 
concept in  Descartes's scheme.)
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behavior, even though — as he's surely aware — many competent 
human language users seem to speak only when spoken to, while others 
(e.g. infants) may exhibit no linguistic behavior at all. According to the 
objection, Descartes's appeal to the Universal Instrument Thesis requires 
that reasonmgi brutes do employ reason] in every situation they can, 
though this requirement is not met even in humans. The objection is a 
good one. Unfortunately, Descartes says very little that would serve to 
clarify his response. Nevertheless, one kind of reply is suggested in his 
claim that 'it would be incredible that a superior specimen of the monkey 
or parrot species should not be able to speak as well as thestupidest child
— or at least as well as a child with a defective brain' (CSM 1:140, AT 
6:58). Given the superior specimen remark, Descartes may hold that the 
reasoned] behavior of even one member of a species is sufficient to 
forestall the unmasking of any member of the species. This suggestion 
comports well with a remark to More:
Infants are in a different case from animals: I should not judge that infants were 
endowed with minds unless I saw that they were of the same nature as adidts; but 
animals never develop to a point where any certain sign of thought can be detected 
in them. (CSMK 374, AT 5:345)
On this reading, exhibitions of linguistic behavior in brutes fall into type 
{Ci) (and thus resolve into type (B)) in part because of a stimidus-depend- 
ence that (according to Descartes) runs across the entire species; in 
contrast, exhibitions of linguistic behavior in human infants fall into type 
(Cii) (remaining masked) because of exhibitions by other humans.
5. The nan-linguistic unmasking test
Yet further consideration of the hypothetical man-machine suggests a 
non-lingiustic unmasking strategy. Since its behavior would stem from 
the predisposition of its mechanical parts (AT 6:57), it would inevitably 
come up short in the kinds of responses it could produce when compared 
with the universal adaptability of reasoni. Consequently, machines that 
exhibit impressive behavior are susceptible to unmaskings insofar as 
they lack mechanical predispositions needed to exhibit a wide variety of 
such behavior.
Descartes's Discourse 5 discussion of non-linguistic unmaskings is 
largely unsatisfying.47 He addresses none of the myriad examples of
47 One plausible explanation of the seemingly cursory treatment is that Descartes 
intends the discussion of non-linguistic behavior — a discussion 1 have been
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Specific behavior alleged (in the popular literature by Montaigne, et al.) 
as best explained by appeal to a rational faculty, Descartes's aim seems 
to be not so much to unmask specific such behavior, in piecemeal 
fashion, as to convey a general strategy by which any such type (C) 
behavior is to be unmasked. Pick your favorite examples of brutes that 
'show more skill than we do' (CSM 1:141, AT 6:58) — e.g., the swallows 
and their seemingly stupendous compass and calendar abilities that 
enable them to arrive in San Juau Capistrano every spring. Assume that 
such behavior is in fact reasoned] — that, e.g., the swallows employ 
reasoni in judging when and where to arrive. In keeping with the Uni­
versal Instrument Thesis, Descartes thinks we should then expect that 
the brutes in question 'would excel us in everything' (i.e. in every kind 
of behavior of which they are anatomically capable); or, at any rate, that 
they would exhibit signs of similarly subtle reasoning] across a variety 
of contexts. We find otherwise. Descartes elsewhere notes that
though their movements a re often more regular and certain than those of the wisest 
men, yet in many things which they would liave to do to imitate us, they fail more 
disastrously than the greatest fools. (CSMK 99, AT 2:40)
The best account is thus 'that they act naturally and mechanically, like a 
clock which tells the time better than our judgement does' (CSMK 304, 
AT 4:575); 'a clock, consisting only of wheels and springs, can count the 
hours and measure time more accurately than we can with all our 
wisdom' (CSM 1:141, AT 6:59).
Though, in his Discourse 5 handling of non-linguistic unmaskings, 
Descartes does not treat any specific examples, in later correspondence 
he does — finally addressing a variety of allegations (as arise in the
suggesting is to be understood as presenting an independent unmasking — to be a 
continuation of the earlier argum ent addressing linguistic behavior. Descartes 
might thus intend to treat the universal lack of language in brutes (as he thinks he's 
now shown) as primary evidence relevant to the non-linguistic unmaskings. So 
understood, the reasoning (again, analogical) might run as follows, Ashe's already 
argued, 'It patently requires very little reason to be able to speak' — a claim he 
supports by analogy to various hum ans wifh marginal intellects (CSM 1:140, AT 
6:58). But, in accordance with the Universal Instrument Thesis, it is implausible that 
any organism that does not use language would excel us in any manner via the 
assistance of reason. The better explanation of such ‘superior' behavior is that it is 
produced purely mechanically. Assuming this is the correct reading, Descartes's 
linguistic unmasking test is perhaps intended to apply to every brute animal that 
exhibits any behavior of type (C) — a not implausible thesis, given how pervasive 
are passionate signings among brutes.
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Montaigne-related literature) of specific, reasoned behavior. To the 
Marquess of Newcastle and to More, respectively, Descartes writes:
Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like d o ck s .T h e  actions 
of honeybees are of the same nature;49 so also is the discipline of cranes in flight, and 
of apes in fighting, if it is true that they keep discipline, Their instinct to bury their 
dea d is no stranger than that of dogs and ca ts which sera tch the ea rth for the purpose 
of burying their excrement; they hardly ever actually bury it, which shows that they 
act only by instinct and without thinking. (CSMK 304, AT 4:S75)
I am not disturbed by the astuteness and cunning of dogs and foxes,s" or by all the 
things which animals do for the sake of food, sex, and fear; I claim that I can easily 
explain all of them as originating from the structure of their bodily parts (CSMK 
365, AT 5:276) '  r  ' v
6. Language as a positive test
Though on my reading of Discourse 5, Descartes does not there charac­
terize positive tests of reasoned, behavior, in his 1646 letter to the 
Marquess of Newcastle he proposes that language — and only language 
might serve as the basis of a positive test:
In fact, rone  of our external actions ohi show [puisse assurer] anyone who examines 
them that our body is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with 
thoughts, with the exception of spoken words, or other signs that have reference to [a 
proposals] particular topicswithout expressing any passion. (CSMK 303 AT 4'574* italics 
added) '
The feature of genuine language use that he thinks resists perfect imita­
tion by mechanical signers is the occurrence of signs that are context-ap­
propriate while being stimulus-free?1
48 Montaigne rhetorically asks, 'Do the swallows that we see on the return of spring 
ferreting in all die corners of our houses search without judgment, and choose 
without discrimination, out of a thousand places, the one which is most suitable /or 
them to dwell in?' (333)
49 Montaigne asks, 'Is there a society regulated with more order*... than that of the 
honeybees? Can we imagine so orderly an arrangement of actions and occupations 
as this to be conducted without reason and foresight?' (332)
50 Montaigne recounts the dog whose behavior results from an 'act of pure logic' 
involving the 'use of propositions divided and conjoined' (339). Of foxes, he 
suggests that they use 'the same reasoning' as humans (337), '
51 Cf. Chomsky, 4ff.
I add also that these words or signs must not express any passion, to rule out not 
only cries of joy or sadness and the like, but also whatever can be taught by training 
to animals. " If you teach a magpie to say good-day to its mistress w hen it sees her 
approach, this can only be by making the utterance of this word the expression of 
one of its passions. For instance it will be an expression of the hope of eating, if it 
has always been given a tidbit when it says it. Similarly, all the things which dogs, 
horses and monkeys are taught to perform are only expressions of their fear, their 
hope or their joy;5 and consequently they can be performed w ithout any thought. 
(CSMK 303, AT 4:574-5)
Prima facie, the Newcastle letter reveals a commitment to a positive 
test of reason, — thus putting Descartes at odds with my earlier conten­
tion that he does not hold a naive view of the imitative abilities of 
machines. I'm inclined to resist this prima facie reading. The Newcastle 
letter contains the only passage in which Descartes discusses such a test, 
and its brevity and wording on the subject leave us with little more than 
speculation concerning important details. The questions left unan­
swered are numerous and significant. Does his commitment to a positive 
test mark a change of view, or does he take it to be continuous with his 
Discourse 5 account? Does he mean that such behavior would elude any 
possible machine, or does he mean to refer only to those machines which 
(like his hypothetical man-machine) produce all their behavior by means 
of anatomical features like ours? Is Descartes's point that it would be 
'practically impossible' for a machine to exhibit such behavior (cf. §111.1), 
or does he mean something stronger? Precisely what would Descartes 
count as a context in which linguistic behavior is both context-appropri­
ate and  stimulus-free? (What context-making feature does not also count 
as a candidate stimulus?) What proportion of normal humans does he 
think ever exhibit such type (A) behavior? Among those humans that 
do, what proportion of their normal speech does he think counts as type 
(A)? Does any normal speech count, or does Descartes mean to refer to 
unique linguistic contexts?51 Does he think that any actual human speech 
counts as type (A), or is he instead claiming that some merely possible 
human signing would count as the 'external actions [that] can show
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52 Elsewhere, it is clear that Descartes thinks brutes can be taught in the senseof being 
conditioned (by means of rewards and punishments) via none other than purely 
mechanical processes. (See note 26.)
53 Again {cf, note 43), such remarks migh t seem to imply that Descartes allows brutes 
such conscious states as fear, hope, and joy. I shall return to this in §IV.l.
54 A San Turing's famous example of a linguistic exhibition that passes his own (Turing) 
test (446) w ould not qualify as type (A) behavior in view of die stimulus-dependent 
character of the witness's responses to the interrogator.
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[jjtu'sse assurer] anyone who examines them that our body is not just a 
self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts'?
A mere clarification of these unanswered questions serves to counter­
balance the prima facie reading. I'll not here speculate as to the answers 
to such questions, since a variety of plausible answers are consistent with 
my interpretation.
IV Descartes's Appeal To the Principle 
of Parsimony
A non sequitur in Descartes's case arises, if the premise set in support of 
the bete machine doctrine is exhausted by (1) and (2). In connection with 
these premises, Descartes argues that neither sensoiy consciousness nor 
a faculty a reason] is necessary for the explanation of any behavior of the 
brutes. (1) and (2) exhaust the premises explicitly offered in Discourse 5, 
but the bete machine doctrine does not follow from their conjunction. This 
premise set does not rule out that brutes have epiphenomenal (i.e. 
causally idle) consciousness.35 The apparent non sequitur is all the more 
egregious insofar as one takes the case for (2) to exhaust Descartes's rasp 
for the bete machine doctrine.
This seeming logical gap between Descartes's actual case, and the 
conclusion of the bete machine doctrine, has fostered misunderstandings 
in the scholarly literature. One camp of interpreters acknowledges that 
Descartes does officially hold the bete machine doctrine, while accusing 
him of slipping between the wide and the narrow sense of 'thought': 
he argues only that brutes have no thought in the narrow sense (= 
reason/intellect), but then concludes that they have no thought at all 
(including sensory awareness), A second camp of interpreters has Des­
cartes rejecting the bete machine doctrine, maintaining that his official 
view is to deny brutes reason but not sensory awareness.57 We should 
want to dispel the worries of the first camp, out of charity. We should
55 Given my wmk reading of the unmasking tests, whereby Descartes intends to 
unmask behavior not behavers (cf. note 35), the alleged non sequitur arises no t only 
in connection with epiphenomenal ton, but also epiphenomenal rationality. On 
a moce standard interpretation, however, since Descartes's two tests are supposed 
to show thal brutes lack a faculty of reason, the non sequitur arises only in 
connection with epiphenomenal sensation. I shall thus /ocus my attention on this 
latter understanding of the alleged non sequitur.
56 Cf. Radner and Radner (79), Loeb (112f), and Vendler (152f£).
57 Cf. Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes?' 230; and Caukroger, 289 and 454n.l65.
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want to dispel those of the second, on textual and doctrinal grounds — 
though I shall have to argue this point.
The worries of neither camp are groundless, given the express argu­
ment of Discourse 5, But such worries are dispelled in the context of the 
larger corpus: there are clear and copious texts establishing the tacit step 
needed to justify the conclusion of the bite machine doctrine, along with 
Descartes's motive for being elliptical. In §IV.l, I argue that a strategy of 
preempting the non sequitur by denying that Descartes holds the bete 
machine doctrine is ill-grounded. In §IV,2, I argue that Descartes is 
appealing to the principle of parsimony — an appeal that avoids the non 
sequitur. In §IV.3,1 will touch on a remaining line of objection.
2, Brutes and sensory aioareness
In various places Descartes refers to such passions, in brutes, as 'their 
hope or their joy' (CSMK 303, AT 4:574-5), and their 'impulses of anger, 
fear, hunger and so on' (CSMK 366, AT 5:278). As one prominent 
commentator observes, Descartes's reference to 'impulses of anger, fear, 
hunger' and so on, is 'quite extraordinary' and unexpected coming from 
'a man who is supposed to believe animals are "without feeling or 
awareness of any kind'" (Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes?' 231), 
adding that nowhere 'does Descartes commit himself to the monstrous 
thesis that they [brutes] have no feelings or sensations' (ibid., 230). As 
already noted, if Descartes did not hold the bete machine doctrine the 
egregious non sequitur is avoided. It has thus seemed attractive to some 
commentators to deny that Descartes holds the doctrine.
Though in attributing passions to the brutes Descartes might seem to 
refer to conscious passion, there is compelling textual evidence to the 
contrary. In all cases of sensation, appetites, and passions, which involve 
(in humans) both a corporeal and an incorporeal component (cf. Princi­
ples 1:48), the relevant terminology — e.g., 'vision,' 'hunger/ "pain' — is 
understood, by Descartes, to have dual reference. When speaking 
strictly, Descartes refers such terminology to a mental component alone; 
in the Second Meditation, he remarks that 'what is called "having a 
sensory perception" is strictly just this [the conscious seeming], and in 
this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking' {CSM 2:19, AT 7:29). 
But in other, less strict contexts, Descartes is clear in referring such 
terminology to the physiological processes that give rise to the corre­
sponding passions in humans.58 To Mersenne, Descartes notes that he
58 In response to a critic of the Discourse who supposes that Descartes allows that brute
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does 'not explain the feeling of pain without reference to the soul/ 
though in brute 'animals it is [mechanical] movements alone which 
occur, and not pain in the strict sense’ (CSMK 148, AT 3:85; my italics). 
Ironically, in the very letter (cited by Cottingham) referring to 'impulses 
of anger, fear, hunger and so on/ Descartes adds that he does not deny 
that brutes have 'sensation, in so far as it depends on a bodily organ" 
(CSMK 366, AT 5:278; my italics). While developing his thought-experi- 
ment of the hypothetical man-machine — a being which, by hypothesis, 
has no rational, sensitive, or vegetative soul — Descartes characterizes 
the machine as experiencing 'hunger' (/aim), 'pain' (douleur), 'joy' (joye), 
anger {colere), sadness' (tristesse), and 'other passions' (autres passions) 
(AT 11:199); Descartes elsewhere refers to its physiological states as 
'internal passions' (passions interieures) (AT 6:55). Note too that in Prin­
ciples 4:190 (cf. Passions 47), Descartes refers to natural appetites which 
depend only on physiology — e,g., 'hunger and thirst which depend on 
the nerves of the stomach, throat and so forth' {CSM 1:281, AT 8a:317-18). 
As explained in the Sixth Replies, Descartes distinguishes three grades 
of sensory response. What he calls the 'first grade' includes only physi­
ological — i.e. purely mechanical — aspects of sensation:
[It] is limited to the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects;
this can consist in nothing but the motion of the particles of the organs, and any
change of shape and position resulting from this motion. (CSM 2:294, AT 7:436-7)
Only this first grade of sensory response is explicitly said by Descartes 
to be 'common to us and the brutes' (CSM 2:295, AT 7:437).
On closer inspection, then, Descartes's reference to 'impulses of anger, 
fear, hunger,' and the like, do not signal a commitment to sensory 
awareness in brutes. Neither, of course, do such texts entail a commit­
ment to the bete machine doctrine. But such references turn out to be 
neither extraordinary nor unexpected coming from someone who is 
committed to the doctrine.
Descartes does sometimes use 'soul'-talk in connection with brutes, 
but his career-long position is that the souls (so to speak) of brutes fully 
reduce to corporeality. In a 1637 letter, Descartes writes (of his Discourse 
5 account):
animals see just as we do, i.e. being aware,' Descartes clarifies that, in his view, 
brutes do not see as we do when we are aware that we see, but only as we do when 
our mind is elsewhere. In such a case the images of external objects are depicted on 
our retinas, and perhaps the impressions they make in the optic nerves cause our 
limbs to make various movements, although we are quite unaware of them. In such 
a case we too move just like automatons' (CSMK 61-2, AT 1:413-14).
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I thought I had clearly explained, that the souls of animals are nothing but {nihil 
aliud\ their blood, the blood which is turned into spirits by die warmth of the heart 
and travels through the arteries to the brain and from it to the nei’ves and nitiscles. 
(CSMK 62, AT 1:414; cf. AT l:414f and 4:64f)
In the Sixth Replies he adds: 'I accept that the brutes have what is 
commonly called "life", and a corporeal soul [anhna corporea] and organic 
sensation [sensus organicus]' (CSM 2:288, AT 7:426). To More, he clarifies 
that what 'can be called the corporeal soul [anhna corporea]' is 'purely 
mechanical and corporeal, and depends solely on the force of the [ani­
mal] spirits and the structure of our organs' (CSMK 365, AT 5:276).
Why then does he speak of souls if he means to refer to corporeal 
processes? In part, he appears to be motivated by theological considera­
tions.39 Moreover, in the context of attempting to persuade a scholastic 
audience (who suppose that souls provide the explanatory principles of 
all the behavior ofbrutes), Descartes may mean to convey that the only 
explanatory principle that is needed — the only soul, if you will — is 
purely mechanical.
Doctrinal considerations prevent Descartes from allowing sensory 
awareness in brutes without also extending substance dualism to them: 
'were I to concede that they [brutes] have thought/ writes Descartes, it 
would then follow that 'in other animals, too, the mind is distinct from 
the body' (CSM 2:287, AT 7:425-6); 'if they thought as we do, they would 
have an immortal soul like us' (CSMK 304, AT 4:576). It might, then, seem 
warranted to conclude that brutes do have souls. As emerges from §IV.2, 
however, Descartes's invocation of parsimony suggests diat he thinks 
there are prohibitive ontological costs in allowing for explanatorily 
superfluous substances.
2. The strategy o f subliminal parsimony
Clear texts establish that Descartes means to eliminate souls (= incorpo­
real entities) in brutes by means of the principle of parsimony, and, 
moreover, that he intends the elimination to be subsumed under a more 
general elimination (by parsimony) of scholastic forms and qualities.10 
Neither point has received due attention in the secondary literature.61 
According to scholastic doctrine, sensitive souls (the locus of sensory
59 Cf. the 1637 letter (of October 3) to Plempius for Fromondus (AT l:414f).
60 Tlie one exception is the human soul, which Descartes regards as the substantial 
form of a human (cf. P. Hoffman, 'The Unity of Descartes' Man,' Philosophical Review
95 [1986] 339-70} and which he does not attempt to eliminate.
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apprehension among brutes) are the substantial forms of brutes. Such 
forms are thus eliminated by parsimony only if the souls of brutes are. 
The problem of consciousness in brutes is — as Descartes construes it — 
a special case of the more general problem of forms and qualities. In an 
early letter (1630), Descartes writes:
As for animals' souls and other [nufces) forms and qualities, do not worry about 
wliat happens to them. I am about to explain all this in my treatise. (CSMK 26, AT 
1:154)
If, as I contend, Descartes intends to eliminate consciousness in brutes 
by means of the principle of parsimony, why does he not straightfor­
wardly say as much in Discourse 5?
As already alluded to, Descartes's procedure is tailor made with the 
intention to win over a scholastic audience. I call the strategy he pursues 
subliminal parsimony, a strategy that involves the following essentials: (a) 
ignore forms and qualities in one's philosophical explanations, to avoid 
overt rejection of scholastic doctrine; (b) emphasize the explanatory 
power and simplicity of the mechanical hypothesis; if asked about forms, 
(c) assert that the existence of such entities (as forms and qualities) is by 
no means in question, but only their explanatory utility. Descartes looks 
to hold that the effect of this strategy is that such entities will eventually 
come to be regarded as explanatorily vestigial and thus eliminated in 
due course.
A variety of textual evidence suggests this. In a letter to Mersenne (28 
Jan 1641), Descartes comments briefly on his motivation for not explicitly 
addressing forms and qualities in the Meditations:
I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their 
truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotie. (CSMK 173 
AT 3:298)
While coaching his student Regius, who was in trouble with scholastic 
authorities for teaching Cartesian doctrine, Descartes elaborates on the 
strategy of subliminal parsimony in a letter (Jan u ary  1642):
61 Garber broaches the subject of parsimony, observing that the case against animal 
souls is analogous to the case against substantial forms. See D. Garber, Descartes 
Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992). My claim is much 
Stronger. Garber indeed worries that 'Descartes may not have explicitly made the 
connection' between parsimony and the bete machine doctrine (115f). M. Rozemond, 
Descartes's Dualism  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998), ch. 4, offers 
a superb discussion of Descartes on parsimony, but she does not make the link to 
the bete machine doctrine.
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Why did you need to reject openly substantial forms and real qualities? Do you not 
remember that on page 164 of my Meteorology, I said quite expressly that I did not 
a t all reject them or deny them, but simply found them unnecessary in setting out 
my explanations? If you had taken this course, everybody in your audience would 
have rejected them as soon as they saw they were useless, and in the mean time you 
would not have become so unpopular with your colleagues. (CSMK 205, AT 3:492)
The relevant passage of the Meteorology reads:
But to keep the peace with the [scholastic] philosophers, 1 have no wish to deny any 
further items which they may imagine in bodies over and above what I have 
described, such as their "substantial forms", their "real qualities", and so on. It 
simply seems to me that my arguments will be all the more acceptable in so far as I 
can make them depend on fewer things. (CSM 1:187, AT 6:239; cf. AT 6:85,7:248-9, 
and 11:25-6)
As the letter to Regius continues, Descartes urges Regius to write an 
'open letter' in reply to Voetius® At this juncture, the coaching proceeds 
in a very concrete fashion: Descartes goes on, as he says, to 'sketch out 
the reply in the form I would think it ought to take' (CSMK 206, AT 3:494)
— a sketch that includes the following:
I fully agree with the view of the learned Rector that those "harmless entities" called 
substantial forms and real qualities should not be rashly expelled from their ancient 
territory. Indeed, up  to now we have certainly not rejected them absolutely; we 
merely claim that we do not need them in order to explain the causes of natural 
things. (CSMK 207, AT 3:500)
As I read Discourse 5, Descartes is employing this strategy of sublimi­
nal parsimony in his treatment of sensory awareness in brutes. In his 
unpublished Treatise on Man, in the precise context of arguing that 
vegetative and sensitive souls are unnecessary to explain the behavior 
of the hypothetical, man-machine, Descartes docs explicitly invoke a 
version of the principle of parsimony: ^nature always acts by the simplest 
and easiest means' (CSM 1:108, AT 11:201). Yet, in tire Discourse (a later 
work that is published), Descartes does not expressly invoke the princi­
ple of parsimony. Instead, his express conclusion is that forms and 
qualities are explanatorily unnecessary. He does of course explicitly 
conclude that brutes have no reasoni, but scholastics already accept that 
doctrine. In a 1637 letter, in response to criticism of his Discourse 5 
argument, Descartes writes that he withheld many lines of support for
62 Voetius (the Rector of the University of Utrecht) had tried to remove Regius from 
his Chair at the University,
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his position 'partly for fear of seeming to want to ridicule received 
scholastic opinions' (CSMK 63, AT 1:415-16).
On my reading, we may reconstruct the final (implicit) steps of Des­
cartes's argument as follows (where souls are understood not as reduc­
ible to corporeality, but as incorporeal entities):
(3) Entities that are explanatorily superfluous (e.g. souls and other 
substantial forms) are to be eliminated.
(4) The souls of brutes (and thus all consciousness in brutes) are to 
be eliminated. [(l),(2)/(3)]
From (1) and (2), it follows that any form of consciousness in brutes__
whether sensory or reasonedi — is explanatorily superfluous. Premise 
(i) warrants the elimination of explanatorily superfluous such states 
Even this reconstruction does not yet fully represent die philosophical 
considerations moving Descartes. I have formulated line (3) in terms of 
explanatory superfluity, since line (1) entails no more than the relatively 
weak claim that sensory consciousness is explanatorily superfluous 
Descartes s own view (never mind the official, published view, one that 
is politically more palatable) is that sensory consciousness is not only 
explanatorily superfluous, but (hat it is causally idle — just as is reason,
in the production of the behavior of brutes. As such, the version of the 
principle of parsimony required by his own position is the weaker — 
where formulated in terms of causal idleness.
3, An objection to Descartes's employment of parsimony
An interesting line of objection remains. Assume (as Descartes contends, 
on my reading) that the principle of parsimony warrants the elimination 
of causally idle sensory consciousness in brutes. Since Descartes's pro­
cedure rests on analogy, the principle of parsimony should warrant an 
analogous elimination of causally idle sensory consciousness in humans. 
But Descartes rejects the latter elimination. Evidently, the principle of 
parsimony does not warrant the elimination of causally idle conscious­
ness m humans. To avoid absurdity, then, it seems we must reject the 
initial assumption as to what the principle warrants in the case of brutes 
The objection deserves careful treatment, though space does not per-
TdZ* f ^ ent ^ ° Ugh 1 bdieVe that a correct ^ d erstan L g  
to ?h? h h 7 ag6nCy pr°Vides him with a Plausible response 
anoAerd^ ' 3 r8COnStruction of 1116 theory wiU have to wait for
Unmasking Descartes's Case fo r the Bete Machine Doctrine1 425
V Conclusion
Measured by contemporary philosophical standards (or fashions, at any 
rate), I have been very generous in the assumptions here granted to 
Descartes. Notably, I have granted his rendition of the distinction be­
tween reasoned (= reasoned,) and purely mechanical causes, a rendition 
that is parasitic on his substantial distinction between mind and body. I 
have focused largely on Discourse 5, while making liberal use of his larger 
corpus of texts and doctrines. I have made no effort, however, to char­
acterize the myriad (and often conflicting) accounts of later Cartesians,63 
though I have given special attention to the views of his immediate, 
intended audience — especially scholastics, and Montaigne-influenced 
readers. It is in the context of these assumptions and methods that I have 
reconstructed Descartes's case for the bete machine doctrine. I have ar­
gued that his version of the doctrine steins from an analogy based on, 
first, the explanatory power of mechanical physiology; second, the un- 
mastability of all apparently rational behavior among brutes; and third, 
the principle of parsimony. On the first two bases rests the thesis that 
neither sensory consciousness, nor reason,, is necessary to explain the 
behavior of brutes (indeed, that reason, is idle in the production of their 
behavior). On the third basis rests the elimination of all explanatorily 
unnecessary entities, with the result that brutes are none other than 
machines. As I have argued, Descartes's case is not without defect, but 
it is much more formidable than standard interpretations would have it.
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63 L.C. Rosenfield does, in her very useful From Bensl-Mnn to Marl-Mnchine (New York: 
Oxford 1940).
